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Most cyberattacks do not start with a sophisticated intrusion. They start with a click on a personal email, a reused password, or a file uploaded to a familiar cloud service because the approved option felt slower. The Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report found that 68% of breaches involve the human element.  Not a zero-day exploit. Not a brute-force attack on a hardened system. Human behavior, in the course of an ordinary working day. For businesses running cloud-based workflows across multiple devices, the personal and professional overlap is now the rule. Understanding where that overlap creates risk is no longer optional.

It’s a statistic that sends a shiver down the backs of SME owners, managers and employees.   According to the FBI’s 2025 Internet Crime Report, business email compromise (BEC) cost US businesses more than $3 billion last year. This makes it one of the most financially damaging cybercrimes on record.  AI has made these attacks harder to detect. The question for AP teams is no longer whether they can identify suspicious requests. It is whether the processes around payments make fraud difficult regardless of how convincing it looks. Why AP Teams Are in the Crosshairs Accounts payable sits at the intersection

You click a link, sign in, approve the MFA prompt, and get on with your day. Completely unaware that someone else just logged into your account at the same moment. That scenario surprises many businesses, particularly those that rely on multi-factor authentication (MFA) to protect cloud accounts. But this is exactly how Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks work.  Rather than stealing passwords for later use, these attacks silently hijack an already-authenticated session in real time. MFA remains a core control, and getting it implemented correctly is still a critical first step for any business.  But AiTM attacks exploit something MFA was

MFA is a strong front-door lock. But it’s not the only thing that decides whether someone can get in. After you sign in, your browser keeps you logged in using a session token (often stored as a cookie). It’s the digital version of a wristband at an event: once you’ve been checked, the wristband proves you belong there. If an attacker steals that wristband, they may not need to beat your MFA prompt at all. That’s the core of session cookie hijacking. The attacker isn’t “cracking” MFA. They’re skipping it by replaying your already authenticated session. This isn’t a reason