Resources

You click a link, sign in, approve the MFA prompt, and get on with your day. Completely unaware that someone else just logged into your account at the same moment. That scenario surprises many businesses, particularly those that rely on multi-factor authentication (MFA) to protect cloud accounts. But this is exactly how Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks work.  Rather than stealing passwords for later use, these attacks silently hijack an already-authenticated session in real time. MFA remains a core control, and getting it implemented correctly is still a critical first step for any business.  But AiTM attacks exploit something MFA was

MFA is a strong front-door lock. But it’s not the only thing that decides whether someone can get in. After you sign in, your browser keeps you logged in using a session token (often stored as a cookie). It’s the digital version of a wristband at an event: once you’ve been checked, the wristband proves you belong there. If an attacker steals that wristband, they may not need to beat your MFA prompt at all. That’s the core of session cookie hijacking. The attacker isn’t “cracking” MFA. They’re skipping it by replaying your already authenticated session. This isn’t a reason

Browser add-ons have a funny reputation. They feel “small”. A quick install. A tiny productivity boost. A harmless little helper that lives in your toolbar. But in practice, a browser extension is more like a micro-SaaS vendor sitting inside your browser session. It can see what you see, interact with the pages you open, and sometimes access the same cloud apps your business runs on all day. That’s why a browser extension security check matters.  Not because every extension is bad, but because it only takes one over-permissioned add-on or one bad update to turn “helpful” into exposure. The good